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INTRODUCTION

A party to a domestic contract governed by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code must answer in damages for its failure to
perform in the absence of an excuse for its nonperformance under
sections 2-613' or 2-6152 or some doctrine or rule from the common
*
Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law; B.A.
1969, Hanover College; M.A. 1970, J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky; Chair of the AALS
Section of Commercial and Related Consumer Law, 1997-98. The author wishes to thank
Kathryn Fitzhugh, Reference/Special Collections Librarian and Associate Professor, Law
Librarianship, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law, J.D. 1983, U.A.L.R.,
M.S.L.S. 1976, University of Illinois, and Reginald C. Johnson, research assistant, J.D. 1998,
Loyola New Orleans, for their assistance.
1.
U.C.C. § 2-613 (1996). That section states:
Casualty to Identified Goods. Where the contract requires for its performance
goods identified when the contract is made, and the goods suffer casualty without
fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer, or in a proper case
under a "no arrival, no sale" term (Section 2-324) then
(a) if the loss is total the contract is avoided; and
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law, such as frustration of purpose under section 1-103? Both the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 4 and the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts, 5 viewed by some as
the Restatement of international contract law, contain provisions for
exemption for nonperformance of contractual duties. Although there
is similarity in language and the substantive requirements among the
UCC, the Convention, and the Principles, both the scope and
application of the provisions vary substantially among these significant
initiatives in commercial law applicable to transactions in goods. This
Article begins with a brief review of prevailing legal commentary on
frustrating events and the allocation of resulting loss; it identifies the
scope of relief available under each of the three bodies of rules, in light
of traditional and modem theories on the treatment of frustrating
events, and suggests that the provisions represent a continuum in the
degree of exemption and application rather than identical relief,
despite the similarity of language and substantive requirements.
Additionally, this Article recommends that Article 2 be revised to
provide an express exemption for buyers upon the occurrence of
frustrating events to create parity between the parties, and that
(b) if the loss is partial or the goods have so deteriorated as no longer to
conform to the contrast the buyer may nevertheless demand inspection and
at his option either treat the contract as avoided or accept the goods with due
allowance from the contract price for the deterioration or the deficiency in
quantity but without further right against the seller.
Id.
2.
U.C.C. § 2-615 (1996). That section states:
Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions. Except so far as a seller may have
assumed a greater obligation and subject to the preceding section on substituted
performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who
complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a
contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by
the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith
with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order
whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
Id
3.
U.C.C. § 1-103 (1996). That section states: "Supplementary General Principles
of Law Applicable. Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity... shall supplement its provisions." Id.
4.
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
sponsored the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods that was adopted
by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference in 1980 (hereinafter the Convention).
5.
See UNIDROIT PRCiLES (1994). The International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) finalized efforts to establish general rules for
international commercial contracts, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts (hereinafter the Principles) in 1994.
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consideration be given to modifying section 2-615 in light of the
remedial provisions of article 6.2.3 (effects of hardship) of the
Principles.
II.

Two ALTERNATVES TO FRUSTRATING EVENTS

Two viewpoints exist on whether courts should intervene to
provide relief or require an adjustment in the obligation of
performance of a contract when an unforeseen frustrating event
occurs. Traditionalists insist, especially
in international transactions,
6
that no intervention should occur. In the absence of a contract term to
the contrary, the parties are deemed to have allocated the loss of the
frustrating event to the party with the burden of performance The
Modernist camp urges, albeit on differing theoretical bases, that
intervention by courts to fill a gap in the parties' agreement is
required.8
A.

The ModernistAlternative-Gap-Filling

The occurrence of a contingency or frustrating event that was
unforeseeable at the time of contracting creates circumstances that
were not within the contemplation of the parties, and therefore
performance exceeds the assent induced and given. 9 Consequently,
intervention is required. Disagreement exists on the methodology to
be employed to allocate the risk and the loss incurred as a result of the
unforeseen frustrating event. Economic theory 0 and risk sharing1
based on "fairness" are two prevailing views on the methodology to be
employed by the courts in gap-filing.

6.
See Harold J. Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract
Practicesin InternationalTrade, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1437-39 (1963).
7.
See id.
8.
See generally Hans Smit, Frustrationof Contract: A Comparative Attempt at
Consolidation, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 287, 297-99 (1958) (explaining that the doctrines of
mutual assent and good faith in continental Europe and English law support gap-filling,
requiring an equitable adjustment of obligations short of discharge).
9.
See Joseph M. Perillo, Force Majeure and Hardship Under the UNIDROIT
PrinciplesofInternational Commercial Contracts,5 TUL J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 11 (1997);
Smit, supranote 8, at 287-88.
10. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrinesin ContractLaw: An EconomicAnalysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
11. See CHARLEs FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CoNTRAcruAL
OBUGATION 59, 70-71 (1981). But see Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Understanding
Commercial Impracticability: Tempering Efficiency with Community Fairness Norms, 27
RUTGERS L.J. 343, 344-45, 357-66 (1996) (offering a hybrid approach to gap-filling).
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Economic Theory

Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfield advocated that the risk of
loss resulting from an unforeseen frustrating event should be allocated
to the "superior risk bearer." 12 If the promisee is the superior risk3
bearer, the obligation of performance by the promisor is discharged.
Likewise, if the promisor is allocated the risk of the unforeseen event
and the loss thereof, as the superior risk bearer, performance must
occur to avoid liability for breach regardless of the increased burden. 4
Determining which of the two parties is the superior risk bearer
requires an assessment of which party was (1) in a better position to
prevent the risk from materializing15 or (2) in a better position to insure
against the risk. 16 Determining whether one is the least cost insurer
requires a determination of (1) risk-appraisal costs, including both the
probability that the risk will materialize and the magnitude of the loss
if it does, and (2) transaction costs.'7
In evaluating Posner and Rosenfield's approach to court
allocation of risk of frustration, Professor Kull, an advocate of the
traditional approach, suggests that the Posner/Rosenfield approach is
inconsistent with the goals of gap-filling-that is, providing a result
that the parties would choose themselves as a suitable generalized
default rule.' 8 Kull concluded that no rational contracting party would
willingly adopt the "superior risk bearing" approach as a default rule,
given the parties' inability to determine ex ante how the court would
resolve the factual determination of risk bearing capacity ex post and
after the unforeseeable frustrating event has materialized. 9 Rational
parties, aware of the "superior risk bearer" default rule would incur
costs determining the possibility of potential risks and the magnitude
of such risks or negotiate an express term to avoid the post frustrating
event determination of its ex ante risk bearing or insuring potential. 20
Thus,
the efficiency of employing an "off-the-rack" default term is
2
lost. '

12. See Posner & Rosenfield, supranote 10, at 90.
13. See id.
14. See id
15. See id
16. See id
17. See id at 91.
18. See Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration,and the Windfall Principle of Contract
Remedies, 43 HASINGS L.J. 1, 43-44 (1991).
19. See id. at 46-47.
20. See id at 46-48.
21. See id.
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Sharing to Fill Gaps

Accepting the gap-filling role of courts, but suggesting an
alternative to economic efficiency as the methodology for allocating
loss for an unforeseen frustrating event, Charles Fried, in his book,
Contractas Promise: A Theory of ContractualObligation, advocated
sharing as the guiding principle for gap-filling in the absence of fault
or negligence by the parties. 22
In frustration cases, there is neither the conferring of a benefit nor
the imposition of harm from some culpable or negligent act that
justifies the allocation of loss to one rather than the other party.
Therefore, Fried concluded that the unforeseen costs should be
shared.23 Sharing requires those joined in a common enterprise to
share unexpected, unbargained-for benefits and losses. Fried argues
that the contractual relationship, a freely chosen concrete relationship,
justifies the duty to share both good and bad fortune.24 The
relationship imposes a duty of caringbetween the parties.'
The Principles reflect some aspect of this approach in hardship
cases. The disadvantaged party may compel the other to renegotiate
the contract. However, this renegotiation is something less than the
"sharing" imposed by law in the first instance; it is a sharing based on
mutual assent.26 Rather than limiting the resolution of the issue to the
judge's perspective of which should bear the risk, the Principles give
the parties who lost the opportunity to address the risk ex ante an
opportunity to allocate the loss ex post and after the frustrating event
has occurred. This approach is an efficient one, consistent with the use
of a general default rule, because unlike the superior risk bearer rule
that encourages extensive negotiation ex ante to avoid judicial
allocation, renegotiation occurs after the frustrating event, when each
party is knowledgeable of its needs and the potential costs and risks to
be borne between them. Although transaction costs are incurred, they
are only incurred if the frustrating event materializes.

See FRIED, supra note 11, at 70-71.
See id; see also RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONTRACrS § 89 cmt. b, ill. 4 (1979)
(requiring modifications of executory contracts to be fair and equitable in allocating and
sharing additional burdens).
24. See FRIED, supranote 11, at 72-73.
25. See id. at 73.
26. See UNIDROIT PRINcipLs art. 6.2.3.(4)(b).
22.

23.
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PactaSunt Servanda-The TraditionalView

Sometimes viewed as harsh, the traditional approach demands
that the loss incurred from a frustrating event must lie where it falls.27
Professor Kull refers to this traditional response to contract frustration
as the "windfall principle."28 The allocation of a windfall, the
unallocated disparity between anticipated and realized contractual
exchange, cannot be justified under the bargain theory, because
nothing in the bargain provides the court with a basis for allocating to
either party all or a part of the windfall. 29 Ergo, there is no
intervention-no restitution for part performance 0 and no obligation
of further performance. Furthermore, he argues that social utility does
not justify intervention-whether one party or the other reaps the
windfall is a matter of indifference, and the reallocation would involve
administrative costs---cost without a social advantage.3
Adherence to the windfall principle places an obligation on the
parties to address frustrating contingencies without the expectation of
judicial intervention. This approach is consistent with the custom in
international trade where parties are accustomed to the "ordinary
obstacles" of war, governmental intervention, unreliable communications systems, and currency fluctuation.32 The gap-filling approach
frustrates the expectations of the parties in view of the custom that
parties are bound in the absence of stated contingencies.
"Liberalization [of the traditional view] impose[s] a heavy burden of
draftsmanship upon the parties. ' 3 Clauses to cover extraordinary risk
are customary,34 and renegotiation or adaptions clauses are
commonplace
in long-term sophisticated international trade
35
agreements.
In view of forty years of commentary, which, if any, of the recent
initiatives in sales law--CISG, the Principles, or Revised Article 2respond to the theories and commentary advanced? A party seeking
27. See Kull, supra note 18, at 6.
28. See id
29. M at6.
30. Professor Kull acknowledges that this position is contrary to prevailing American
authority which "favors a more liberal allowance of restitution to adjust the losses attendant
upon frustrated contracts." Ide at 33; see also RESTArEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 377
reporter's note (citing Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act § 1 (1943) (English law
authorizing restitution as is justified by the circumstances)).
31. See Kull, supra note 18, at 6.
32. See Berman, supra note 6, at 1415 (addressing the custom in international trade
of generic goods).
33. laM
34. See id at 1414-16.
35. See Perillo,supra note 9, at 11.
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exemption under the UCC, the Convention, or the Principles must
establish an unforeseen event or contingency that was not within its
control and could not have been avoided in order to avoid liability for
damages. Given the similarity of requirements, are the rights
substantially similar under the three bodies of rules? Is the scope of
application identical? Part I of this Article addresses these and other
issues, distinguishing and comparing the three bodies of rules.
III.

CURRENT & REvisED ARTICLE 236

A.

Casualtyto the Goods (Sections 2-613, R2-714 7)

Substantially similar to the traditional concept of impossibility,
section 2-613 permits a discharge of the seller when specific goods in
existence at the time of contracting 8 have suffered casualty without
the fault of either party.39 The seller is discharged without liability for
nonperformance if the loss is total; the agreement is avoided. 4° If the
loss is partial, the buyer may either avoid or perform under the
36. The proposed revisions to the excuse provisions for frustrating events of the
revised Article 2 do not make substantial changes to the sections of the current Article 2. The
proposed revisions do contain some clarification of issues raised under the current statutory
language. Those clarifications will be reviewed for the reader's benefit. Citations to
proposed sections of the revised Article 2 will be cited as R2-XXX to distinguish its
provisions from the current article.
37. U.C.C. § R2-714 (Revised Draft March 1998). That section states:
Casualty to Identified Goods.
If the parties to a contract assume the continued existence and eventual delivery to
the buyer of goods identified when the contract is made and the goods suffer
casualty without the fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer
and no commercially reasonable substitute is available, the following rules apply:
(1) The seller shall seasonably notify the buyer of the nature and extent of
the loss.
(2) If the loss is total, the contract is avoided [terminated].
(3) If the loss is partial or the goods no longer conform to the contract,
the buyer may nevertheless demand inspection and may treat the contract as
terminated [avoided] or accept the goods with due allowance from the
contractprice for the partial loss or the nonconformity but without further
right against the seller.
Id.
38. See U.C.C. § 2-613. Identification of the goods under section 2-501 is an
essential requirement of both section 2-613 and R2-714. However, the Notes to proposed
section R2-714 state an attempt to liberalize the standard reflected in section 2-613 by
substituting for the phrase describing the goods as goods "the parties assume the continued
existence and eventual delivery to the buyer" for the term "contract requires for, its
performance." No real substantive change should result from this "more lenient test," given
the further clarification included in the Notes that excuse is only applicable if "no
commercially reasonable substitute" for the goods is available. U.C.C. § R2-714 n.1
(Revised Draft July 1997).
39. See U.C.C. § 2-613.
40. See id, § 2-613(a).
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contract. 4 To the extent the goods are accepted, the buyer is entitled
to an allowance against the price for the deficiency without further
relief against the seller.42
No mention is made in section 2-613, however, regarding the
availability of restitution to the buyer of any portion of the price
previously paid as a deposit or installment on total casualty to the
goods.4 3 On its face, in the context of total casualty, section 2-613
appears to leave the loss where it falls. The seller does not receive
restitution for any preparation of the goods for performance, and no
provision is made for restitution of any prepayments or deposits by the
buyer. However, section 1-103 permits supplementation of Article 2
unless the specific provision in question displaces the applicable
common law rule.4 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts in
sections 272 and 377 grants a court broad flexibility to provide relief
to the buyer who has made prepayments or deposits.45 Going beyond
restitution, the Restatement authorizes recovery of reliance expenses
even though the other party has not benefited' from them and grants
the court the power to supply terms "as justice requires," to fill the gap
in the contract that resulted from their failure to address at contracting
the circumstances existing after the casualty to or deterioration of the
goods. 47 The supplementation available under the existing article
should likewise be applicable to the revised Article 2.
B.

Impracticability(Sections 2-615, R2-716)

Upon the occurrence .of an unforeseeable frustrating event, "a
contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption, ' ' S only
the seller's delay or nonperformance is excused. Unlike the scope of
49
relief available under the Principles and the Convention,
impracticability of performance is expressly available only to the seller
under current Article 2 with the suggestion of the availability of relief
for buyers under Official Comment 950 However, the revised Article
41. See id. § 2-613(b).
42. See id
43. See id § 2-613.
44. See id§ 1-103.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 272,377 (1979).
46. See id§ 272 cmt. a.
47. See id § 272(2).
48. U.C.C. § 2-615; see U.C.C. § R2-716 (Revised Draft March 1998).
49. See UNIDROIT PRNCIPLES art. 6.2.1. (1994).
50. See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 9. That comment states:
[W]here the buyer's contract is in reasonable commercial understanding

conditioned on a definite and specific venture or assumption as, for instance, a war
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2 will reflect an intent by the drafters to foreclose any use of
impracticability by buyers and to limit buyers to the relief available
under the common law doctrine of frustration of purpose under section
1-103.1
Section 2-615 operates as a general default gap-filling rule if the
parties have not by agreement determined the scope of the seller's
obligation. The section grants as relief an excuse for the delay or
nonperformance to the extent the performance was affected by the
contingency 2 or adaption, expressly limited to prorating the seller's
production among its customers. 3 Although the Official Comments
suggest a broader scope of adjustment if "neither sense nor justice is
served by either answer54 when the issue is posed in flat terms of
'excuse' or 'no excuse,"' case authority provides little evidence of an
attempt to expand the relief available 5
IV. ThE CONVENTION
Broader in application than the UCC, the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods extends the rule of
exemption beyond delay and nondelivery to all aspects of either
party's performance. 6 However, this broad statement of exemption
should not include a nonconforming tender, goods delivered but
defective. Exemption is available after a preliminary determination
of three factors58 established by the nonperforming party: (1) the
procurement subcontract known to be based on a prime contract which is subject
to termination, or a supply contract for a particular construction venture, the reason
of the present section may well apply and entitle the buyer to the exemption.
Id But see Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 E2d 265, 277 (7th
Cir. 1986) (cited in Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on "Purpose" in the
Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Orno ST. LJ. 419, 448 n.105 (1997) (explaining that section
2-615 is inapplicable to buyers, and the official comments were not adopted by the Indiana
state legislature)).
51. See U.C.C. § R2-716 n.2 (Revised Draft July 1997).
52. See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 11 (1996).
53.
54.

See idA § 2-615(b).
Id. cmt. 6. See generallyMarion W. Benefield, General Provisions,Sales, Bulk

Sales, 36 Bus. LAw. 1267, 1282 (1981) (acknowledging the effect of Official Comment 6).
55. But see Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 R Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa.
1980) (holding that seller was entitled to reformation of a conversion service contract).
56. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF 97/18, Annex 1 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter
C.I.S.G.].
57. See JoHN O. HONNoLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE
1980 UNrrED NATIONS CONVENTION 427 (1982); see also id. (1991 ed.).
58. The causal connection between the impediment and the failure to perform must
be established and may be viewed as a fourth factor. See C.M. BIANcA & M.J. BONELtL,
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failure to perform was due to an impediment beyond his control
(occurrence of an external impediment); (2) at the time of contracting,
the party could not reasonably be expected to have taken the
impediment into account (unforeseeable); and (3) following the
contract, the party could not reasonably be expected to have avoided
or overcome the impediment or its consequences (unavoidable). 9
Use of the term "'impediment'-a word that ... [connotes or]
implies a barrier to performance, such as delivery of the goods rather
than an aspect personal to the seller's performance," is evidence of an
intent by the Diplomatic Conference to exclude defective performance
resulting from a party's personal performance and to give effect to
other articles authorizing remedial recovery for such failures.64
Impediments such as industrial disputes, fire mobilization, requisition
embargo, currency restrictions, insurrection, shortage of transport,
general shortage of materials, or limited use of power should be
established.61 Professor Honnold uses the following hypothetical
situation to illustrate article 50, Reduction of the Price,62 but it also
illustrates the interplay between exemption from liability for damages
because of an impediment without excuse for defective performance:
Seller contracted to sell a $100,000 cargo of No. 1 quality Edam cheese
to Buyer ... with delivery by June 1 "Ex ship" at a port in Buyer's
country.... Seller dispatched cheese that conformed to the contract; the
time of dispatch and other shipping arrangements would have led,
under normal conditions, to timely and safe arrival of the shipment.
However, unexpected hostilities led to the interning of the ship for two
months during its transit through a canal. Normal refrigeration facilities
on the ship could not cope with the hot climate in the canal area; when
the ship finally arrived on August 1 the cheese was moldy and graded
at only No. 4 quality ... [T]he moldy cheese was worth ... one-fifth
of the contract price .... Buyer needed the cheese ... and elected to
keep the cheese ....
Buyer has the right to avoid the agreement but elects not to do so.
Under article 79, the seller is exempt from damages for the two-month
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION, art.

79 1 2.6 (1987).
59. See C.I.S.G. art. 79(1).
60. HONNOLD, supra note 57, at 432; see also BiANCA & BONELL, supranote 58, art.
791[2.6.1.
61. See HONNOLD, supra note 57, at 343 (discussing contingencies included in
exemption clauses in standard contracts supervised and finalized by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe).
62. See C.I.S.G. art. 50; HONNOLD, supra note 57, at 309; see also id at 313
(discussing the history and evolution of price reduction from Roman law).
63. HONNOLD, supranote 57, at 310.
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delay. However, the buyer is entitled to a price reduction under article
50 for the decrease in value of the goods delivered. Although the
defective performance-moldy cheese-was not the result of the
seller's personal performance but rather resulted from the impediment
that was beyond the seller's control and could not have been avoided
by him, the seller is not entitled to full contract price. The illustration
suggests that, having assumed the risk of loss until tender at a port in
the buyer's country under the terms of the contract, the exemption
from damages for failing to deliver on June 1 is unavailable to
alleviate the seller's duty of personal performance to tender
conforming goods at the designated port. Furthermore, neither party
gets a windfall under this resolution of the issues. The seller bears the
loss of the one-fifth reduction in the value of the goods, and the buyer
bears the loss incurred from the late delivery.
Although broader in its applicability, exemption under the
Convention is more narrow in scope. Unlike the UCC, which is
applicable to circumstances of impracticability where performance is
possible but unduly burdensome or would cause economic hardship,
the Convention is limited to those impediments that result in
impossibility of performance but not impracticability, frustration, or
imprivision.64 Thus, the Convention is more restrictive than the UCC
on the degree of exemption available and reflects more of the
traditional view of pacta sunt servanda if increased costs of
performance are experienced. In the absence of contractual provisions
that authorize exemption upon frustration or impracticability, such
theories should not be appropriated from domestic law in
contravention of the express goals of uniformity and international
interpretation that are consistent with the international character of the
Convention. 65 However, if the character of international trade evolves
and is reflected in usage, interpretation of the Convention should
likewise reflect this change.
In the context of exemption because of nonperformance of a third
party, both the Convention and the UCC recognize exemption.
However, the Convention does not appear to be as stringent in
applicability as the UCC, which requires, before section 2-615 is
applicable, the nonperformance of an agreed exclusive source of
64. See id 1435.1; BIANcA & BONELL, supra note 58, art. 79 1 3. But cf Henry D.
Gabriel, A Primeron the United Nations Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods:
From the Perspective of the Unifonn Commercial Code, 7 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 279,
308 (1997) (stating the view that CISG is closer to the civilian approach to frustration of
purpose and more permissive than the common law).
65. See C.I.S.G. art. 7.
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supply or one assumed or contemplated as the particular source of
supply.66 In contrast, the Convention permits exemption if both the
third party and the party seeking the exemption satisfy the three
conditions required under article 79.67 The legislative history behind
article 79 suggests that the third party must be more than the seller's
general supplier. While not agreed to as the exclusive or sole source,
the third party must stand in a delegated contractual relationship such
as a subcontractor.68 Nonperformance by a general supplier of goods
would not constitute the kind of impediment necessary for the seller to
qualify individually under article 79. Although more comprehensive
in the types of third parties, the availability under the Convention is
more restrictive because of the scope of impediment necessary to
establish the right to an exemption.
Finally, the remedial relief under the Convention is not limited to
avoidance or allocation. Article 79, subsection 5 expressly reserves
the right of both parties to pursue all rights under the Convention,
excluding the recovery of damages.69 Consequently, restitution for any
portion of the price paid or goods delivered can be demanded, as well
as any benefit accruing to the party who received the part
performance.7° Unlike the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, no
reliance expenses incurred by the seller may be recovered in the
absence of some benefit accruing to the buyer. Some have argued that,
in addition to avoidance, article 79 reserves the right to specific
performance. 71 However, such a view is inconsistent with the rights
granted to the party seeking exemption in view of an impediment that
caused the failure to perform, and should not be sought as a right of the
other party in all cases.72
V.

TEE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES

In 1994, a Working Group of the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) finalized the Principles for
International Commercial Contracts applicable to contracts for goods
66.
67.
.68.
69.

70.

See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 5 (1996).
See C.I.S.G. art. 79(5).
See HoNNoLD, supra note 57, 1 433.
See C.I.S.G. art. 79(5).

See id arts. 79(5), 81(2), 84.

71. See Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in InternationalSales:
Towards an InternationalInterpretationof the Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REv. 607,
620-21 (1988); Wanki Lee, Exemptions of ContractLiability under the 1980 United Nations
Convention, 8 DICK. J. INT'LL. 375, 392 (1990).
72. See MICHAEL J. BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcr LAw
112-13 n.21 (1994); HONNOLD, supranote 57, at 551 (1991).
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and nongoods.73 Lauded as the most serious effort in harmonizing
international contract law,74 the Principles were drafted by individuals
acting in their individual capacity rather than as governmental
representatives. "The group that prepared the rules was not bound by
instructions of governments with their mostly conservative attitude
towards new legal inventions. ' Thus, the rules on exemption in the
Principles seek to address unforeseen contingencies without any
attempt to show a deference for any system's domestic rule of law and
to provide well-reasoned principles of international law to govern
contracts that are more often
of longer duration and greater complexity
76
contracts.
domestic
than
Despite the express fundamental principle that a validly entered
contract is binding,7 7 the Principles expand the concept of exemption
beyond those reflected in the UCC or the Convention. The Principles
recognize two contexts in which a party's duty of performance might
be excused, hardship 78 and force majeure.79 The first, hardship, would
encompass frustration, imprdvision, and impracticability."0 The second,
force majeure, addresses exemption when performance becomes
impossible.
A.

Hardship

Hardship requires a change in circumstances so severe and
fundamental that the promisor cannot be held to its promise in spite of
the possibility of performance. If an unforeseeable event, not within
the control of the disadvantaged party and the occurrence of which
was not a risk assumed by the disadvantaged party, occurs or becomes
known after contracting, and the equilibrium of the contract is
fundamentally altered for either party because of an increased cost of
73. See UNIDROIT PRiNciCiEs preamble (1994).
74. See generally M.J. Bonell, Unification of Law by Non-Legislative Means: The
UNIDROIT Draft Principlesfor InternationalCommercial Contracts,40 AM. J. CoMP. L.
617, 618-19 (1992); Peter Linzer, The UNIDROIT Principlesof International Contracts:
Should American Lawyers Pull Their Hair Out Over Them?, 13 TIX. TRANSNAT'L L.Q. 1
(1997); Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts:
The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv.281,282-84 (1994).
75. Dietrich Maskow, Hardship and Force Majeure, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 659
(1992).
76. See id. at 657; Perillo, supra note 9, at 11.
77. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLEs art. 1.3; hL at. 6.2.1. See generally Maria
Viscasillas, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Sphere of
Applicationand GeneralProvisions, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 381,423 (1996).
78. See UNIDROIT PRciPLEs art. 6.2.2.
79. See id.art. 7.1.6.
80. See id art. 6.2.1 cmt. 2.
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performance or the decrease in value of the performance to be
received, hardship results.8' Although performance has become more
onerous or burdensome, if performance is possible, such possibility of
performance distinguishes hardship from article 79 of the Convention
where performance is impossible. Additionally, hardship is distinguishable from frustration of purpose under the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts which is available to buyers under section 1-103 of the
UCC. Restatement section 265 only permits discharge when a party's
principal purpose is substantially frustrated. The principal purpose
"must be so completely the basis of the contract that, as both parties
understand, without it the transaction would make little sense." 82 The
mere fact that the transaction has become less profitable is insufficient
to establish frustration of purpose;" the performance must become
commercially valueless, which requires near total frustration. 84 At
least one author suggests that a fifty percent decrease in value of the
performance to be received or a fifty percent increase in the cost of
performance is sufficient to satisfy the "fundamental change"
requirement of article 6.2.2,85 a substantial difference from the level
reflected in section 265.
The criteria required for exemption by both the UCC and the
Convention are likewise applicable under the Principles:
an
unforeseeable event or contingency, beyond the party's control, and
the occurrence of which was an unassumed risk. Unlike the UCC and
the Convention, the Principles mandate good faith, constructive
renegotiation between the parties to adapt the contract to the
unforeseen circumstances.86 Here, the parties, in the first instance, are
allocated the responsibility to resolve the disequilibrium or to fill the
gap in their agreement. Only after an unsuccessful attempt for a
81. See idart. 6.2.2. This article provides:
There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the
equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a party's performance has
increased or because the value of the performance a party receives has diminished,
and (a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the
conclusion of the contract; (b) the events could not reasonably have been taken
into account by the disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the
contract; (c)the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and
(d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party.
Id
82. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) oFCoNTRACrS § 265 cmt. a (1979).
83. See id
84. See id cmt. a, ill. 5, 6; see also Felt v. McCarthy, 922 P.2d 90 (1996) (finding
developer's intended purpose for use of land adversely affected by wetlands regulations but
some use remained available, so commercial frustration inapplicable).
85. See Maskow, supra note 75, at 662.
86. See UNIDROIT PRiNcEPLEs art. 6.2.3 cmt. 5.
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reasonable time may either party request the intervention of a court or
arbitral tribunal.
In the absence of an agreement between the parties to adapt the
contract, a court is authorized to grant four possible options of relief if
it finds a hardship: (1) terminate the contract at a specified date and on
terms to be fixed; (2) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its
equilibrium; 7 (3) direct the parties to resume negotiations to reach an
agreement adapting the contract; (4) confirm the terms of the contract
as originally agreed. 88 A disadvantaged party may not during the
pendency of renegotiation or resolution withhold its performance.
B.

Force Majeure

Force majeure under the Principles is a restatement of exemption
under the Convention with some clarification of the remedial rights
reserved.8 9 Thus, the analysis and experience under the Convention
will illuminate article 7.1.6.
VI. CONCLUSION

Despite the similarity of language and factors to be established, a
party desiring to plan for exemption for nonperformance is confronted
with a continuum of exemptions rather than identical opportunities for
relief. Greater leeway and flexibility of exemption and remedial rights
are granted in the Principles. The Convention limits exemption to
impossibility of performance with the UCC falling between the two.
Because parties may opt out of the Convention 9° and elect to be
governed by the Principles9 ' or the UCC, knowledge of the
distinctions between these rules is important. Furthermore, proposed
revisions to UCC Articles 1 and 2 suggest that parties may opt out of
Article 2 and elect to be governed by other rules of law such as the
Convention or the Principles.92 However, the choice of law provision
of the revised Article 1 may limit the right of parties to a domestic
contract to elect international rules as the governing law for their
transaction. Nonetheless, where the express terms of the agreement
87. See id. art. 6.2.3(4)(a)(b).
88. See BONELL, supra note 72, at 76.
89. See id at 112-13 n.21. But see Maskow, supra note 75, at 664-65 (asserting that
exemption under the Principles is enlarged because the right to demand specific performance
under the Convention is unavailable here).
90. See C.I.S.G. art. 6.
91. See UNIDROIT PRiNCIPLES preamble.
92. See U.C.C. § R2-104 n.1 (Revised Draft July 1997); U.C.C. § R1-303 (Revised
Draft September 1997).
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delineate the standard to be applied for exemption, that express
provision-even if extracted from the Principles-should be honored
by the courts.
As the process of revising Article 2 continues, thought should be
given to providing parity between buyers and sellers under the express
terms of the statute. Currently, sellers are entitled to exemption when
performance becomes impracticable but not impossible. Buyers may
have some right to exemption under section 2-615, but clearly have a
right under section 1-103 to resort to the doctrine of frustration of
purpose. This, however, requires near total frustration before an
exemption can be granted. This difference in standards is inconsistent
with prevailing international practice and will thereby limit the
exportability of the UCC to other countries. The burgeoning global
marketplace, the growing interdependency among sovereign nations
on the international trade of goods, and the impact of modem
computer and telecommunications technologies that facilitate
transnational and global contracting strongly suggest that the current
initiative to modernize Article 2 should be more global in its focus in
an effort to encourage the harmonization of the commercial law of the
sale of goods.

